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Abstract 
Cascading events and the disruption of interconnected critical infrastructure (CI) are a well-known 
challenge for emergency planning and management. Although new modelling and forecasting tools 
are increasing the availability of mitigation options, further work is needed  to consolidate good 
policies and practices.  
This paper presents a case study on London, United Kingdom (UK). It develops an integrative research 
process with local stakeholders aimed at applying the theory of cascading disasters in London’s 
response and preparedness strategies.  A mixed method approach is adopted to explore the 
awareness of cascading risk, the perception of possible mitigation measures, and the current levels of 
training amongst the stakeholders of the London Resilience Partnerships.  Specific items investigate 
the relation of cascades with cross- border crisis management, and climate change.  
The results propose new quantitative and qualitative evidence that highlights the divergence between 
risk awareness and its integration in policies and practices, discussing options for improving multi- 
agency coordination and organisational resilience. The conclusions define a list of actions that should 
be strategic priorities for policies and decision makers, such as the improvement of inter-modal 
coordination and the release of open access guidelines, proposing new open questions for scholars in 
the field.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction  
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The complexity of networked society and the uncertainties inherent in emerging threats, such 
as geomagnetic storms, are challenging our approach to crisis management.  It has been 
suggested that extreme scenarios could be more common than was previously supposed, 
requiring a new understanding of their drivers (Sornette 2009). However, those challenges 
involve the whole anthropogenic domain and cannot just be associated with specific hazards.  
It is known from the “normal accidents” theory that  interdependent technological systems 
are prone to multiple and unexpected failures that can trigger cascading disruptions (Perrow 
1999).   Events such as the failure of telecom satellite Galaxy IV (1998) and the North America 
Blackout (2003), highlighted the need for improving the protection and resilience of critical 
infrastructures (CI), intended as those systems or assets that are vital for social functions 
(Setola et al. 2016).  The multiple domains of CI were recognised both in terms of hardware 
and services, including their interdependencies with all ordinary activities of life (Little 2002; 
Rinaldi et al. 2001). It became clearer that CI failures could generate widespread breakdowns 
beyond the conventional  organizational and hierarchical borders (Boin and McConnell 2007; 
Egan 2007; Helbing et al. 2006).  However, the cascading dynamics associated with those 
patterns remained fragmented in literature and practices (May 2007), and scholars often 
concentrated on models that were limited by the absence of testing in real-life scenarios 
(Peters et al. 2008). 
The state of the art evolved after some high -impact events in the early 2010s, such as the 
eruption of the Eyjafjallajökull volcano, and the challenges associated with climate change 
scenarios. It was more visible that the increased complexity of global networks challenged 
governance, jurisdictions, organisational and societal resilience (Alexander 2013; Ansell et al. 
2010; Galaz et al. 2011; Labaka et al. 2016; Parker 2015; Setola et al. 2016). Thus, it was 
suggested that a paradigm shift in safety and risk analysis strategies was urgently needed to  
improve  the adaptive capacity to complex challenges (Helbing 2013; 2015; Linkov et al. 2014).   
Further steps in understanding cascading and interconnected dynamics has been supported 
by the EU 7th Framework Programme and Horizon 2020,  evolving  forecasting tools and 
decision support systems (Galbusera et al. 2016; Jonkeren et al. 2015; Setola et al., 2016). 
Other complementary approaches evolved from CI modelling, including cross-cutting 
contingency planning and scenario building.  It was considered that cascading disasters could 
be associated with complex and evolving secondary emergencies, which tended to become 
the centre of the crisis (Pescaroli and Alexander 2015).  That process is multi-dimensional. It 
includes: A) the losses of vital services due to the shifting states of operations in the CI, from 
routinely  to stressed (Nieuwenhuijs et al. 2008); B) The impact of external triggers on 
hazardous facilities (Argenti et al. 2016; Krausmann and Baranzini 2012); C) The cross-scale 
challenges involving socio-ecological systems (Galaz et al. 2011). It has been suggested that 
these cascades require a shift in scenario building and training, focusing on the escalation of 
secondary events to increase the flexibility in situations of operational uncertainty (Pescaroli 
and Alexander 2016). First, it has been recognised that CI disruptions can orient international 
relief by causing a shortfall of goods and expertise associated with the loss of services, 
NATECH emergencies, and damages to cultural heritage (Pescaroli and Kelman 2017).  
Secondly, it had been shown that risk maps have to be integrated with critical infrastructure 
rankings, promoting the development of cross-scale assessments of socio-ecological 
vulnerabilities (Nones and Pescaroli 2016). Thirdly, vulnerability scenarios could be used in 
new tools to enhance the capacity of local communities to be resilient to  complex events 
such as blackouts (Münzberg et al. 2017). In conclusion, it is essential to introduce best 
practices in emergency planning that could frame together the different components of risk, 
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referring to the possibility of unexpected paths (Alexander 2016). It has been shown that the 
vulnerabilities in the technological component of CI could be coincident between natural and 
human-made risks, being also common to other triggers that are unknown, or at least highly 
uncertain, with the potential of compromising or challenging emergency management 
(Pescaroli et al. 2018). 
A gap that has not been investigated is how cascades, interdependencies and escalations are 
perceived by CI stakeholders and emergency managers and which could be the implications 
for preparedness. Specific procedures, such as wider impact trees, have been adopted by 
some governmental bodies in charge of standards for organisational resilience (Macfarlane 
2015), but are these lessons really incorporated in practices? The literature suggests there 
could be still a lack of understanding of CI dependencies amongst emergency planners and 
responders, increasing the impact of emergencies (Luiijf and Klaver 2009; 2013). Indeed, the 
complexity of cascading effects can challenge the existing knowledge of emergency 
personnel, as well as their faimiliarity with the possible evolutions of the events, increasing 
the disturbances and the uncertainties in decisions (Amon et al. 2016).   
This paper aims to investigate this area of risk perception (Slovic and Weber 2002), supporting 
with new quantitative and qualitative data the development of a consistent framework for 
cascading risk in policy making.  We apply an integrative research process with the local 
institutions to link knowledge into action, considering how to improve decision making under 
high uncertainties  (Cornell et al. 2013; Wardekker et al. 2008). The goal is to verify if 
cascading risk and interconnected failures are sufficiently addressed in the multi-agency 
planning assumptions of Greater London. This case study is relevant for the state of art 
because London’s infrastructure and society are highly integrated in the global networks, 
concentrating some of the financial and transportation hubs in the region. In the next sections 
the applied nature of the research is explained, including the synergies with the authorities, 
the research precursors, and the key questions investigated. In the second instance, the 
methodology adopted for the assessment is described, and the results are illustrated 
highlighting the implications for the current multi-agency response capacity. In conclusion, 
possible mitigation actions and guidelines for policy makers are suggested. 
 
 
2.  Integrative research process 
This work is a result of a collaboration between the Research Group on Cascading Disasters 
at the UCL Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction (CASCADES@IRDR), and London Resilience 
(LR).  LR acts on behalf of the Mayor of London, Greater London Authority, Local Authorities 
and London Fire Brigade. It aims to coordinate institutions and communities to “prevent, 
handle, recover and learn from disruption, and adapt to change” 
(www.londonprepared.gov.uk ). The London Resilience Partnership (LRP) includes more than 
170 organisations involved in emergency response and preparedness in London, United 
Kingdom (UK). In 2012, LR developed ANYTOWN, a generic and replicable model used to 
“raise awareness of the consequences of infrastructure disruption with all emergency 
response organisations in London” (Hogan 2013). It is structured to be applied easily in most 
cities using workshops that produce evidence on the typical impacts of disruptions regardless 
of their initial trigger. The effects of hypothetical failures are reported in an onion-skin 
diagram including both short- and longer-term effects, communicating the message in a way 
accessible for non-academic audience. The complementarities of the work of 
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CASCADES@IRDR suggested  promoting a data collection at the ANYTOWN workshop in 
March 2017. The event was organised by LR, in collaboration with the London Climate Change 
Partnership (LCCP), the UCL Institute for Risk and Disaster Reduction, and with support from 
Transport for London (TfL).   It was held at the London City Hall to “consider the broader 
consequences resulting from a disruption to transport networks”, and it was closed -doors.  
The invitations were sent to the members of the Partnership, such as emergency response 
organisations, public utilities, businesses, and academia. ANYTOWN was organised in two half 
day sessions, in the morning and the afternoon, with a cap on the number of participants to 
assure an active discussion. In each session, an introduction to the workshop explained the 
ANYTOWN model, the concept of cascading effects and disasters as reported by Pescaroli and 
Alexander (2015), and  London’s strategy for adapting to climate change. A short overview of 
the scenario was followed by roundtables. The trigger hazard was a hypothetical heat wave, 
whose features were derived from the existing literature (Birkmann et al. 2014). However, 
facilitators of LR were present at each table and encouraged the participants to focus on the 
possible interdependencies, cascading effects, and escalations. A complementary 
methodology was used to assess the multi-agency response and preparedness capacity and 
it will be explained in the next section.   
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
The methodology was developed with a constant dialogue between CASCADES@IRDR, LR, 
and the LCCP that allow  maintaining a reliable interface between science and policies (Cornell 
et al. 2013; Wardekker et al. 2008). First, it had to be replicable in future workshops, being 
complementary to the output of the discussion groups. Secondly, it had to provide 
quantitative evidence for policy-makers, integrating possible feedbacks of the participants. In 
conclusion, the data collection had to target a mixed audience with limited time availability.  
It was chosen to relay on questionnaire as common practice in the assessment of risk 
perceptions, civil protection programs, and emergency management at large(Abrahamsson 
et al. 2010; Alexander 2002; 2005; 2015; 2016; Lindell et al. 2007; Perry and Lindell 2003; 
Quarantelli 1997; Slovic and Weber 2002). The questions followed the standard approach of 
quantitative research (Bryman 2012; Van Evera 1997), and were analysed with SPSS V.24.  
However,  the participatory nature of the workshop and the complexity of the topic suggested 
integrating a mixed method approach to record the bottom up perspectives of the LR 
Partnership (Axinn and Pearce 2006; Palinkas et al. 2011). Each section of the survey included 
open questions for the respondents: they asked for suggestions about possible mitigation 
measures, training strategies, general comments on the workshop, and on who should assure 
the consistency of information. Those answers were investigated with a qualitative content 
analysis, using together inductive and deductive considerations (Berg 2004).  The categories 
were cross- checked with LR to verify their consistency with the operational and legislative 
terminology in use.  The main hypothesis was that if the current crisis management approach 
to cascading risk was inadequate, then it was expected that the answers could highlight: 
 
1) A strong awareness of cascading risk and interconnected failures, not adequately 
supported by policies and planning strategies.  
2) High values attributed to most mitigation measures, and average integration of longer term 
climate change in planning. 
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3) Lack of consistent training, with high values attributed to all the possible tools suggested.  
The next section describes the design of the questionnaire before proceeding to the analysis 
of data. 
 
 
3.1 Questionnaire design  
 
Questions and answers were discussed with LR, and the LCCP, as suggested in the integrative 
research process. The items were formulated together to limit possible sectorial biases and 
ambiguities. The output was tested with a pilot involving the LR team that verified the 
consistency of the terminology for the target audience of the workshop. Similarly, the visual 
layout of the questionnaires was checked with pre-printing to avoid a lack of clarity that could 
limit the response rate (Boynton and Greenhalgh 2004). It was agreed a five page 
questionnaire, including the introduction, that required approximately 5-10 minutes to be 
completed on a self -administered basis. The first page reported a standard disclaimer that 
specified the goal of the research, the referents, and guaranteed the anonymity and privacy 
of the respondents. The questionnaires were structured in four sections:  
 
 Section 1 - Stakeholders’ perception of cascading events and interdependencies. This 
section explored the awareness of cascading risk, its relationship with other drivers such 
as climate change, and the actual prioritisation in policies and practices.  
 Section 2 - Stakeholders’ opinion about mitigation strategies. This section investigated the 
perceived utility of existing mitigation measures and the potential of other tools 
suggested in the literature. At the end of this section the participants were asked to write 
down suggestions about possible mitigation measures that should be prioritised and were 
not included in the list. 
 Section 3 - Stakeholders’ opinion about training related to cascading events and 
interdependencies. This section assessed the existing levels of training, and which training 
measures could be more useful. At the end of this section  the participants were asked to 
write down possible training other than the one listed.  
 Section 4 -  Stakeholders’ experience and affiliation. This section asked general questions 
about experience, affiliation, gender and perceived utility of the workshop. Those values 
were needed to correlate the results, promoting more focused policies.  There was space 
left for general comments.  
The existence of validated and published surveys was considered for the formulation of each 
item (Boynton et al. 2004).  In the preliminary phase of the design, the possible literature of 
reference was listed in a descriptive table as suggested by Brugess (2011), then it was 
discussed with the stakeholders. However, this process was limited by the scarcity of studies 
linking cascading disasters, emergency preparedness, and training: more than replying to 
specific questions and results, it was possible to derive possible options generically identified 
in the literature that had to be tested.  The reference for “Section 1” was mostly the 
references reported in the introduction and methodology of this paper, while in “Section 4” 
were considered standard drivers of risk perceptions that were also needed by LR as generic 
data on the workshop. “Section 2” and “Section 3” integrated cross-cutting considerations on 
mitigation and training. The researches on sectorial failures and cascades, both generic and 
case-specific specific, suggested testing different mitigation options.  In particular, it was 
possible mitigation role of scenario building and contingency planning (Alexander 2016;  
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Pescaroli and Alexander 2016), integration of hazard risk with rankings of CI (Nones and 
Pescaroli 2016), datasets to improve fast deployment of emergency response (Gianluca 
Pescaroli and Kelman 2017), and decision support systems (Setola et al. 2016). The evidence 
of the  2010 ash cloud highlighted issues in the reliability of thresholds in probabilistic data, 
communication and information sharing, and intramodality (Alexander 2013; Scaini et al. 
2015; Ulfarsson and Unger 2011).  Localized and improved energy supply were also suggested 
as possible priorities for policy makers, together with the need of considering international 
mitigation strategies and climate change drivers in planning and activities  (Ansell et al. 2010; 
CAA 2014; Galaz et al. 2011; Helbing, 2015; OECD, 2011; Petermann et al. 2011). The possible 
training options  referred to the ones available by the UK Cabinet Office’s Emergency Planning 
College (Macfarlane 2015),  and more in general feasible to be implanted by LR. Table 1 
reports the final questions used for the questionnaires, including their section and the 
number of reference. The multiple items are highlighted in grey, while the open items that 
allowed discretionary answers in yellow. A standard Likert scale, from 1 (not at all) to 5 
(extremely) was used for most items,  and reported both qualitatively and quantitatively 
according to conventions in the assessment of civil protection and emergency management 
s (Alexander 2015,Bryman 2012, Lindell et al. 2007). The synthesis by Brown (Brown, 2010) 
was used for maintaining the correspondence between the numeric and qualitative values. 
Moreover, the awareness of specific tools and experience in training (Q18 a, b and Q22) was 
assessed using polar questions (yes/no). Three answers (Q13, Q21, and Q23) required the 
development of new categories: 
 
 Q13 tested which organisations should be in charge of information in line with the 
protocols of LR, with a multiple answer that wanted to test collective versus individual 
responsibilities. The categories were derived by the work of Lindell et. al. (2007), Perry 
and Lindell (2003), but included a UK perspective that referred to the grey area of 
stranded passengers (CAA 2014). The possibility of an open answer was included, as has 
been reported in Table 1.   
 Q21 asked for the respondents’ experience and seniority level, but a clear and appropriate 
scale was not found in the literature. It was derived approaching a standard definition 
used by human resources online (University of Virginia 2016), which were cross-checked 
with the feedbacks of the LR team and LCCP (Table 1).  
 Q23 asked to define the respondents’ affiliations, which had to be focused on the 
members London Resilience Partnership. To mediate possible cultural divides,  it was 
decided to integrate the categories used by Lindell, Prater, and Perry (2007), with the one 
described by the UK legislation for emergency management (UK Cabinet 2013).  
 
In conclusion, it must be noted that questionnaires were distributed in each discussion table 
at the beginning of the event. This was supported by a short explanation by LR and 
CASCADES@IRDR, where it was highlighted the value, the simplicity, and the limited time 
commitment needed for the contribution. It was emphasised that the essential findings will 
be included in the final report of the event (Burgess 2001), and that the research was finalised 
to improve the coordination of the LRP.  The next sections of this research will explore the 
quantitative and qualitative results of the analysis. The possible limitations of the research 
will be included in the discussion section to derive open points for future researches to be 
included in the conclusions. 
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Table 1 - Sections and questions of the survey 
Section N. Question 
Section1 
Perceptions of 
cascading 
events and 
interdependencies 
Q1 How relevant are cascading events to emergency management? 
Q2 Do you think loss of essential services can cause risks to life and personal safety 
or security? 
Q3 To what extent are service disruptions catered for in UK emergency planning? 
 To what extent do you think cascading events and interconnected failures are: 
Q4a Prioritised in existing policies? (e.g. multi-agency response frameworks) 
Q4b Prioritised in practice? (e.g. stakeholder interoperability) 
Q4c Integrated in agreements for cross-border crisis management? (e.g. activation 
and deployment of the EU civil protection machinery) 
Q5 Would a common definition of 'tipping points' and definitions of acceptable risk 
and uncertainty be helpful in coordinating emergency response? 
Q6 Do you think cascading events could become more common as a result of 
climate change? 
Section 2                             
Opinion about 
mitigation 
strategies 
 
 
How helpful do you think the following tools could be in understanding cascading 
events? 
Q7a Scenario building  
Q7b Contingency planning  
Q8 Do you think information on the resources available to combat service 
disruptions could be used to improve procurement strategies and the  
deployment of aid and relief? (e.g. ready-to-eat meals supplied after  
blackouts) 
Q9 Do you think it could be useful to integrate hazard risk with rankings of the criticality 
of infrastructure? 
Q10 Do you think improving coordination among different transport modes should be a 
priority in order to mitigate large-scale disruption?  
Q11 Do you think more localised energy sources could improve the resilience of critical 
infrastructure? 
Q12 How useful are interactive tools and real-time decision support systems to 
understand the effects of cascading disruptions? 
Q13  In the case of service disruptions, who do you think should assure the consistency 
of information given to the public? (One option has open answer) 
Q14  Do you think cascading events and associated service disruptions require the 
development of international mitigation strategies? 
Q15 Are you considering longer-term climate change in your planning and activities? 
Q16 Is there anything else that has not been mentioned that should be prioritised? 
(Open answer) 
Section 3                    
Opinion about 
training 
Q17 Have you received sufficient training to understand and address cascading events 
and interdependency of services? 
 Are you aware of methodologies such as: 
Q18a Wider impact analysis and impact trees 
Q18b Other forward-looking tools 
 How useful do you think the following training on cascading events and their 
interdependencies might be? 
19a An intensive course for public utility services 
19b Roundtable events or table top exercises 
19c Freely available guidelines 
19d Webinars and on-line lessons   
19e National and trans-national exercises  
Q20 Is there anything else that has not been mentioned which should be prioritized? 
(Open answer) 
Section 4 
Experience and 
affiliation 
Q21 How would you define your level of experience and proficiency in this sector?   
Q22 Have you ever participated in training sessions or workshops on cascading or 
interdependent events?  
Q23 What is your affiliation?  
Q24 Are you:    Male    Female     Other   Prefer not to say 
Q25 Was this workshop useful for you?   
Q26 Do you have any other comments? (Open answer) 
Table 1- Items used in the questionnaires, with highlighted multiple questions (grey) and discretionary open 
answer (yellow).  
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4. Quantitative analysis  
Overall, ANYTOWN was very well attended by local stakeholders. It had 74 participants, 69 
without the event coordinators, filling the room available at the London City Hall in both 
sessions. The workshop had good gender balance, with slightly more female representatives 
(33 males and 40 females). The full institutional support of LR, LCCP, and TfL, allowed 
thecollection 57 questionnaires which were equivalent to a response rate of approximately 
82% of participants. The forms were considered valid if at least 70% of the mandatory answers 
were completed, in line with the standard quantitative methodology described earlier, 
reducing the analysis to 54 questionnaires. This small drop is likely to be associated with the 
fact that many stakeholders were available for emergency calls or had pre-scheduled 
meetings, inducing some of them to leave the room before the end of the event. The next 
sections describe the distribution of the frequencies for each part of the questionnaire, 
analysing separately their correlations. 
 
4.1 Perceptions of cascading events and interdependencies 
 
The respondents unanimously agreed that cascading events are extremely relevant to 
emergency management (M=4.7, SD= ± 0.5). Despite the common perception that loss of 
essential services could be very risky to life and personal safety or security (M=4.57, SD= ± 
0.49), the answers highlighted that disruptions were just somewhat catered for in UK 
emergency management (M= 3.31, SD=±0.67). In particular, cascading events and 
interconnected failures were only marginally prioritized both in existing policies (M =2.88 
SD=± 0.58), and practices (M=2.81, SD=± 0.68). Similarly, the respondents perceived a lack of 
integration in the existing agreements for cross-border crisis management, such as the 
deployment of the EU civil protection machinery (M=2.57, SD=±0.95). However, the value of 
the standard deviation suggests some more fragmentation in the average values, with a 
consistent per cent of missing responses (13%). The lack of shared agreement on this item   
could be easily explained by the fact that the operational role of many participants did not 
necessarily required the knowledge of cross-border drivers. Finally, the questionnaire pointed 
out that a common definition of 'tipping points' and acceptable risk is be needed (M=3.76, 
SD=±0.77), while it was agreed that cascading events could become more common because 
of climate change (M=4, SD=±0.76). In both cases, slightly more than a half of the answers 
were concentrated in the highest values of the Likert Scale.  Figure 1 provides a graphical 
overview of the perceptions of cascading risk recorded in this section. It points out the 
contrast between the relevance and possible impacts, the need for training, the potential of 
its association with climate change, compared to the integration in policies and practices.  
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Figure 1 – Perceptions of cascading events and interdependencies (Q1-Q6). The mean is represented in blue and 
the SD in orange. The values are based on a Likert scale from 1-5, with no answer being 0 and 5 being the most 
positive value. 
 
 
4.2 Perceptions of mitigation strategies 
 
Scenario building (M =4.09, SD=±0.49), and contingency planning (M=4.4, SD=±0.57), were 
unanimously recognized as essential tools to understand cascading events. The other 
mitigation measures must be investigated more carefully, as all of them were perceived useful 
but with different levels of fragmentation. There is agreement that better information about 
the resources needed for contain escalations could improve procurement and response 
(M=3.77, SD=±0. 73). In this case, the valid answers are concentrated in the top tiers but 
balanced by one third of average answers.  In line with the expectations, a very high priority 
was attributed to the integration hazard risk maps with ranking of CI (M=4.02, SD=± 0.75) and 
to improvement of intermodal inter-modal coordination (M= 4.07, SD=± 0.72). In the first 
case, approximately 77% of valid answers were cumulated in the top values (4 and 5), rising 
to 85% for intramodality.  Interactive tools and decision support systems were perceived as 
very useful (M=4.02, SD=± 0.82), but with a fragmentation that can be associated with some 
of the comments.  Similar patterns, but with much more variability, are attributed to energy 
sources (M=3.75, SD=±0.95), which in the frequency table are literally split between some 
improvement (42% of valid answers), high improvement (approx. 23%), great improvement 
(approx. 29%). When interrogated about who should assure the consistency of information 
to the public, the respondents used multiple answers. The government appeared in 82% of 
cases (39% standard percent), followed by utilities in 52.0% of cases (28.4% standard percent) 
and business 26%of cases (12.4% standard percent). The category ‘other’ was used in 22% of 
cases, while lower values attributed to NGOs and Academia. Surprisingly, individual 
responsibility or no need for coordination was indicated in just one answer.  
In conclusion, the respondents are only moderately trying to integrate longer term climate 
change in planning (M=3.56, SD=± 0.86), with in some cases additional comments in the open 
questions.  The perceived need for developing international mitigation strategies for 
cascading events and service disruptions had the lowest values in the section, and it was 
distinguished also by highest standard deviation (M=3.07, SD=±1.02). The values showed the 
existence of a wide disagreement amongst the respondents that are nearly equally divided 
between the high-low peaks. Figure 2 reports the visual output of this last question.  
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Figure 2 – Overview of two key aspects of mitigation strategies. The mean is represented in blue and the SD in 
orange. The values are based on a Likert scale from 1-5, with no answer being 0 and 5 being the most positive 
value. 
 
 
4.3 Perceptions of training 
 
The perceived levels of training among the respondents were just somewhat sufficient, with 
high fragmentation in the answers that suggests better analysis of target groups (M=2.9, 
SD=±1.01). The frequency table points out a slight concentration in the lower tiers, with 10% 
of missing answers that in some cases were explained in the comments. However, it is positive 
to note that most participants were aware of wider impact analysis and impact trees (73.6% 
valid percent), and other forward-looking tools (60.8%). The most useful options for 
improving future training were freely available guidelines (M=3.92, SD=± 0.8) and tabletop 
exercises (M=3.87, SD=± 0.68). They were followed by intensive courses for public utility 
services (M=3.77, SD=± 0.85) and national and transnational exercises (M=3.70, SD=± 0.79).  
In the first case, approximately 73% of valid answers were concentrated between very and 
extremely high values, while the concentration was anyway unequivocal even in the case of 
the exercises (approx. 62%).  Instead, webinars and online lessons were not perceived so 
useful and were distinguished by high variation in the answers, discouraging de facto any 
investment in that option without any understanding of possible target groups (M= 3.36, 
SD=±1.02). The general high values of the possible training tools suggested clearly the need 
to undertake actions for improving the situation (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3 – Perceptions of training(Q17-Q19e). The mean is represented in blue and the SD in orange. The values 
are based on a Likert scale from 1-5, with no answer being 0 and 5 being the most positive value. 
 
 
4.4 Experience, affiliation, and gender 
 
The respondents were very well distributed amongst all the levels of experience (Figure 4).  
There was a perfect balance between novices and stakeholders advanced experience (25% 
each), a consistent intermediate level between 3 and 5 years (30.8%), and a valid 
representation of experts with more than ten years in the sector (15.4%). Just a couple of 
people had basic awareness of the topic, in line with what was expected by the organisers. 
Most of them (56.6%) already participated in training workshops on cascading or 
interdependencies. Most participants were Category 1 responders (40.7%), intended as core 
emergency services and local authorities, and Category 2 responders (11.1%), intended as 
private sectors bodies such as utilities. These were followed by academia (16.7%), business 
not included in Category 2. (14.8%), other categories (approx. 11.1%), and with lower 
participation of NGOs and charities (3.7%).  The gender balance of the registered participants 
of the workshop was reflected in the responses, that had 52.8% female respondents and 
47.2% of males. Finally, the ANYTOWN workshop was considered useful by most of 
participants (M=3.77, SD=0.77). 
 
 
                                                Figure 4-  Experience levels among the respondents 
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4.5 Correlations between answers 
 
The particular nature of the dataset suggested  testing the existence of possible correlations 
among the answers, in order to have a better overview of which items could be associated 
together (Cohen, 1988; Evans, 1996).  However, it must be considered that the final goal of 
this work is supporting policy making, and not deriving any psychological models for which in-
depth methodologies, such as regressions, may be needed. Our analysis used Pearson’s 
coefficient to verify the possible consistency between the continuous variables reported in 
section 1, section 2, and section 3, according to the research goals. The responses were 
considered significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed), and the effect size was in line with the 
values used by Evans (1996).  Secondly, cross-tabs were used to assess the correspondence 
between other continuous variables and the ordinal ones such as experience and affiliation. 
They were preferred to other tests, such as multinomial logistics or Cramer’s v, for two key 
reasons: 1) To maintain a higher accessibility of the content for end-users; 2) To assess the 
existence of sub groups, that could determine differences in the development of training 
strategies and targeted work.    
 
 
4.5.1 Correlations within sections 
 
A primary analysis explored if there were any of correlations within the answers of section 1 
(Perception of cascading events), 2 (Opinion about mitigation strategies), and 3 (Opinion 
about training). This was done to verify the existence of possible drivers that could be useful 
for policy makers, and a synthesis of the output is reported in Table 2. In section 1, the results 
show the existence of a moderate positive relationship between the prioritization of 
cascading events and interconnected failures in existing policies and practices (r=0.444, n=51, 
p=.001). Similarly, a moderate positive relationship was found between the prioritization in 
policies and the integration in agreements for cross-border management (r=0.508, n=46, 
p=.000). It can be noted that those results suggest that there was a tendency to have a 
common view between high prioritization in policies and practices, while the responders that 
perceived some higher values in policies, believed also that there was more integration at the 
international level. In section 2, higher values perceived for the integration of hazard risk 
maps and rankings of CI were weakly associated with higher values attributed to the use of 
localized energy sources for improving resilience (r=0.366, n=50, p=.009). Instead, a moderate 
correlation was found between the usefulness of improving intermodal transportation and 
the localized energy sources (r=0.478, n=52, p=.000). These correlations, together with the 
values of those registered in the previous sections, may suggest that higher value in energy 
were perceived as part of the interconnected challenges more than a self-standing mitigation. 
In conclusion, the analysis of section 3 revealed some unexpected trends. A moderate 
correlation was found between the training received and the perceived utility of roundtable 
and table top exercises (r=0.396, n=47, p=.006). Intensive courses for public utility services 
were weakly correlated with training on national and transnational exercises (r=0.380, n=53, 
p=.005), while those had a similar relation with webinars (r=0.382,n=53,p=.005), and 
moderate correlations with table top exercises (r=0.491, n=53, p=.000). Instead, a strong 
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correlation was found between how useful were perceived freely available guidelines and 
webinars (r=0.607, n=53, p=.000). 
Questions and answers correlated within each section Value (r) Strength 
Q4a (policies) and Q4b (practices) 0.444 Moderate 
Q4a(policies) and Q4c (cross-border management) 0.508 Moderate 
Q9 (hazard risk and CI ranking) with Q11 (localized energy) 0.366 Weak 
Q10 (intermodal transportation) and Q11 (localized energy) 0.478 Moderate 
Q17 (training received) and Q19b (roundtables and exercises) 0.396 Moderate 
Q19a (course for public utility) and Q19e (transnational exercises) 0.380 Weak 
Q19e (transnational exercises) and Q19b (exercise)  0.491 Moderate 
Q19e (transnational exercises) and Q19d (webinars) 0.382 Weak 
Q19c (guidelines) and Q19d (webinars)  0.607 Strong 
Table 2- Correlations within each section of the questionnaire. QN refers to number the full questions reported 
in Table 1.  
 
4.5.2 Correlations across sections 
 
A different analysis was run to understand the correlation across the sections (1 to 3), with 
care to understand if training levels were associated to any variations in the opinions about 
mitigation strategies and risk perceptions. A synthesis table is reported in Table 3, where 
there can be noted some weak and moderate correlation. The first evidence that emerges is 
that despite it being expected that the existing training to orient most of the results, there 
was nothing diffused. Indeed, the general levels of received training were moderately 
correlated just with the perceived integration of cascading in agreements for cross-border 
management (r=0.496, n=45, p=0.001). This last item was also moderately correlated with 
roundtables and table top exercises (r=0.481, n=46, p=0.001), and with the training level on 
national and transnational exercises (r=0.422, n=46, p=0.003). Surprisingly, the availability of 
guidelines was weakly correlated with tipping points and acceptable risk (r=0.372, n=53, 
p=0.006), giving the idea that in case of uncertainties the availability of open source material 
can make the difference.  Instead, there are limited relations between the values attributed 
to mitigation measures and policies. Contingency planning was weakly associated with the 
perception that the loss of essential services can cause risk to life and personal safety 
(r=0.385, n=54, p=0.004). The values attributed to the perception that service disruption 
require the development of international mitigation strategies were weakly correlated to the 
perceived prioritisation of cascading risk in policies (r=385, n=51, p=0.005). Finally, as may 
have been expected, the responders that perceived more cascading events more common as 
a result of climate change had the tendency to include long term climate change in planning 
(r=381, n=50, p=0.006). 
 
Questions and answers correlated across sections Value (r) Strength 
Q17 (training received) and Q4c (cross-border management) 0.496 Moderate 
Q19(roundtables and tabletop exercises) and Q4c (cross-border 
management) 
0.481 Moderate 
Q19e(transnational exercises) and Q4c (cross-border management) 0.422 Moderate 
Q19c(guidelines) and Q5 (tipping points) 0.372 Weak 
Q7b(contingency planning) and Q2 (service disruption and life losses) 0.385 Weak 
Q14(international mitigation strategies) and Q4a (policies) 0.385 Weak 
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Q15(long term climate change in planning) and Q6(cascading more common 
as result of climate change) 
0.381 Weak 
Table 3- Correlations across the sections of the questionnaire. QN refers to number the full questions reported 
in Table 1. 
4.5.3 Are experience and affiliation orienting the perception of training and mitigation 
measures?   
 
Cross- tabs were used to verify if the values attributed to the training options were associated 
with any level of experience and proficiency in the sector. In other words, chi-square analysis 
was used to test any correlation between the levels of experience, risk perceptions, mitigation 
measures, and training options. This was done to understand the existence of possible target 
groups, but the test showed low levels of confidence due to a general fragmentation of 
answers.  A similar analysis was applied to test the existence of correlations between the 
affiliation and the training options. The results showed different levels of statistical 
confidence, but it was possible some target groups for two forms of training:  
1) Courses for utility services presented fragmented answers (χ²= 0.087), but they were 
considered tendentially very useful mostly by Cat 1 responders, Cat 2 responders, and 
academia. 
2) Roundtables and table top exercises had less fragmented answers (χ²=0.058).  It is 
unequivocal that nearly the total of Category 1 responders perceived this training very 
useful, and this is true also for Academia, NGOs and others.  Category 2 responders were 
instead quite undecided, and business had the tendency to perceive this training less 
useful.  
 
However, it must be noted that this result may have been affected by the limited number of 
representatives of categories such as Nongovernmental, not-for-profit, and religious 
organization. We recommend further analysis to test each training. Similarly, we decided not 
to run correlations with Q18a,b (wider impact analysis and other forward looking) because 
the vast majority of the participants knew the tools, and the limitations in the dataset could 
have influenced the result. In conclusion, Gender did not influence the general perceptions 
of risk, but we decided not to test this possible influence on mitigation and training. This 
element could have been interesting in a psychological study, while it could not drive 
suggestions for decisionmakers for whom now these are mandatory non-discriminatory 
policies. 
  
 
5. Qualitative content analysis: Mitigation, training, and other comments 
 
The qualitative content analysis (Berg, 2001) offers a complementary overview of 
stakeholder’s perceptions, integrating a bottom up perspective. The comments are 
categorized following to their sections in the questionnaire (Mitigation, Training, Other), to 
provide a better framework of the answers.  
 
5.1 Suggested mitigation strategies 
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Approximately a third of the participants (17/54) suggested some mitigation options that 
were not already included in the questionnaire. Table 4 reports the category of the training 
suggested, together with the identity of each questionnaire, the affiliation, the participation 
to previous training (Q22), the experience in the sector, and the transcription of each 
comment. All the levels of experience and affiliation were represented, although not in the 
same proportions as the quantitative data.  In particular, it must be noted that most of the 
suggestions (13/17) were made by personnel that already participated in training sessions 
(Q22), and may have already had a clear idea of what was missing in the current practices and 
policies. This makes the qualitative analysis of particular relevance, in line with the needs of 
LR and LCCP, highlighting some common problems reported in the literature (Abrahamsson, 
Hassel, and Tehler, 2010; Alexander, 2002, 2005, 2016; Alexander, 2015; Lindell, Prater, and 
Perry, 2007; Perry and Lindell, 2003; Quarantelli, 1997). The coding process, cross-checked 
with LR to maintain coherence with their operational language, suggests the following areas 
of improvement: 
 
 Community resilience. Comments referred to the need for better mitigation strategies 
aimed to improve local resilience, integrating top down and bottom up approaches, and 
the specificities of local contexts. The respondents had mixed affiliation and the 
experience, while 3/5 of them had already participated in training sessions. 
 Coordination. Comments reported one of these coordinations is still a challenge that 
needs to be solved at all levels. The answers referred to inter-agency protocols, to the 
central government and the local authorities, but also between protocols of climate 
change adaptation and emergency preparedness. In this case, 3/4 of the comments were 
made by Category 1 responders, and allof them participated in training sessions.  
 Knowledge of risk, interdependencies and vulnerabilities. Comments referred to the need 
to assess better the dynamics associated with the topic of the workshop, and the 
vulnerability of the system at large.  In this case, the answers were just affiliated to 
academia and Category 2 responders, that for the majority participated intraining and had 
a polarised experience between novice and advanced.  
 Information sharing and financial support. The information sharing was perceived as an 
essential element to improve and still not timely enough for business. There was 
suggested more governmental support in terms of information on how to access funding.  
The affiliation was mixed, all respondents had training and experience. 
 
 
Mitigation 
suggested  
ID  Affiliation Trai
ning 
Exp. 
(years) 
Opinion about mitigation strategies 
Q16) Is there anything else that should be prioritised? 
Community 
resilience 
M01 Cat. 2 No 10+ “Lessons learned to improve processes”. 
M16 Academia No 3-5 “Difference between local/national +urban/rural context”. 
M23 Cat.1 Yes 10+ 
“If we combine fire +police is there a risk of lack of 
resources/funding in a major emergency? Community resilience”.  
M25 Cat.1 Yes 1-3 
“More public awareness of longer term consequences of sudden 
impact events and building community resilience into people 
mind sets (The public should no longer expect public sector to 
instantly resolve their issues)”. 
A 02 
 
Cat. 2 Yes 3-5 
“Culture and behaviour of populations. Training for individuals –
perhaps in conjunction with (word not understandable) services”. 
Coordinatio
n 
M22 Cat.1 Yes 3-5 
“Central government support for when local capacity is exceeded. 
How we prepare communities for this risk”. 
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A16 
 
Cat. 1 Yes 10+ 
“More focus on transferable (word not understandable) warning 
info inter-agency, cross- warning (or working) 
A22 
 
NGO Yes 1-3 
“Coordination between police, NITS, fire government tv control 
communication, operations etc.”. 
A28 
 
Cat. 1 Yes 3-5 
“Linking climate change adaptation with emergency 
preparedness response arrangements”. 
Knowledge 
of risk, 
interdepend
encies and 
vulnerabiliti
es 
 
M10 
Cat. 2 No 5-10 
Do we fully understand all the key risks and (word not clear) the 
utility to quantify them?”. 
M12 Academia No 0-1 “Key vulnerabilities e.g. food supply routes, mortuary capacity”. 
M24 
 
Academia Yes 5-10 
“Simulation of nonlinear interdependencies and feedback loops 
as help to understand consequences, e.g. system dynamics, 
system thinking tools etc.”. 
A01 Academia Yes 1-3 
“There are still unknown (inter)dependencies that can 
cause/affect cascades. Something like route diversion (?) that can 
result in railway bridge strikes or water main bursts that can 
interrupt transportation services and other business. Not much 
data/information/understanding available”. 
A11 Cat. 2 Yes 5-10 “Weather effect on civil failures”. 
Information 
sharing and 
financial 
support 
M19 
 
Business Yes 5-10 
“Communication to business and people are key if must be timely 
more than 100% accurate (80% often is better than 100% less 
often)”. 
A09 
Cat. 2 
 
Yes 3-5 
“Financial + funding required for info gathering +production of 
support systems etc. where is the money going to come from?”. 
A31 
 
Cat.1 Yes 10+ 
“Guidance for finance, human resources, what would the 
government do to assist”. 
Table 4- Open answers and categories of “mitigation strategies”.   
 
5.2 Suggested training  
 
The comments on training werefar fewer, with 10 answers the total of which just 9 were 
coded. The explanation for the difference in the participation is that the most common 
options used for training were already included in the questionnaires, as highlighted by one 
of the respondents (answer not coded).  Table 5 reports the training suggested, the identity 
of the respondents, the affiliation and the comments transcribed from the questionnaire. In 
this case, the number of participants that had training is well balanced with its overall 
percentage, while the majority of the comments weremade by Cat. 1 responders. The coding 
was harder due to the limited number of suggestions, but some general outlines can be 
derived:  
 
 Training and awareness of the public. The comments suggested improving the training of 
the public, raising awareness. This approach could be in line with the previous answers 
suggesting the development of mitigation actions on community resilience. 
 Coordination. This is often a structural issue in disaster prevention and management. 
Some elements were recurrent with the previous table, such as the support of central 
government planning to local planning, and the need for a multi-agency approach that 
includes business continuity. Interestingly, it was suggested to consider better the 
implications of transportation disruptions on the movement of key personnel.  
 Optimised scenario and exercises. Some answers highlighted the relevance of scenario 
and exercises, in particular “in person” ones, supporting the evidence defined by the 
quantitative data. However, one comment refers to the need to understand better the 
lessons learned from the existing training, which is in line with the need for integrating 
the qualitative commentary in this research. 
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Training 
suggested 
ID Affiliation Trai
ning 
Exp. 
(years) 
Opinion about Training 
Q20) Is there anything else that should be prioritised? 
Training and 
awareness 
of the 
public 
M09 Cat.1 No 3-5 
“Public awareness campaigns. Public in the UK are ill prepared for 
emergencies unless near COMAH included sites”. 
M16 Academia No 3-5 
“Training for the public too”. 
Coordinatio
n 
M22 Cat.1 Yes 3-5 “Central government planning and support for local planning”. 
A28 
 
Cat.1 No 1-3 
“Business continuity multi-agency approach e.g. to priotising 
critical sources across sectors”. 
A 02 
 
Cat.2 Yes 3-5 
“Considering impacts of movements of key staff outside of 
expensive city-centre location and therefore more transportation 
required implications”. 
Optimised 
scenario 
and 
exercises 
M23 Cat.1 No 1-3 
“More lessons learned. Lots of public reports etc. etc. not 
necessarily put into practice”. 
M24 Academia Yes 5-10 “Scenario games”. 
A11 Cat. 2 Yes 5-10 “Cat 1+Cat 2 exercises and workshops”. 
A18 Cat.1 Yes 5-10 
“Real ‘in person’ sessions are better than ‘virtual as networking + 
talking+ listening to colleagues in other professions gives 
extended understanding of other priorities/ challenges +needs”. 
NN 
  
A31 
 
Cat.1 Yes 10+ 
“None”. 
Table 5- Open answers and categories of “training” .  For “training” is intended if the respondent had ever 
participated in training session or workshops on cascading or interdependent events (Q 22, Table 1). 
 
 
5.3 Other comments  
 
Even when the option “other” in answer 13 is considered (Table 6), most of the comments 
refer to the need for better integrating of the local communities as pro-active agents instead 
of mere receptacles of information, while all the actors should act more “together”.  Indeed, 
the open option to question 13 on who is in charge of assuring the information does not add 
much evidence to the quantitative findings. Many of the respondents chose multiple answers 
and decided to write comments near their options as reported in the last table. The coding 
was harder due to the limited number of answers, but some general outline can be derived: 
 
 Multiple actors at different levels: The majority of respondents in the table marked 
multiple choices, and commented using the option “other”, or the blank space, to 
highlight the existence of levels of responsibility and coordination dependent on the 
situation.  One referred directly to the role of Gold Commands as a specification of 
governmental duties. 
 Local resilience forum and partnership: It is interesting to note that some answers 
referred to resilience forum, devolved institution and partnerships that have a mixed 
nature, representing a network more than single institutional actors. 
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Q13 
“Other”  
ID  Affiliation Trai
ning 
Exp. 
(years) 
Q13) Who do you think should assure the consistency of 
information 
Multiple 
actors at 
different 
levels 
M10 Cat.2 No 5-10 Multiple answers, comment: “at different levels”. 
M11 Other Yes 3-5 
Multiple answers, is specified “transport companies” that should 
be business. 
M16 Academic No 3-5 Multiple answers, it is specified “with a coordinated routine”. 
M17 Cat.1 Yes 10+ 
Multiple answers, it is specified “The lead agency who declares 
major incident”. 
M14 
Cat.1/aca
demic 
Yes 3-5 
Marked just other: “the owner of the risk should /does own the 
communication. and multi-agency platform uniform the 
message”. 
A 11 Cat.2 Yes 5-10 Multiple answers, comment: “joint”.  
A 16 Cat.1 Yes 10+ 
Multiple answers, comment “It could be all depends on 
situations. I would want SME’s to deliver info- not police talking 
fire brigade stuff!” All the options are marked together.  
A 18 Cat.1 No 3-5 
Multiple answers. Comment “Together. Health authorities in 
relation with partners”.  
A 19 Cat.1 No 1-3 
Multiple answers, comment. “All- Joint agreement of messaging 
required”.   
A25 Cat.1 No 1-3 Multiple answers, comment “London Gold Comms. Group”.  
Local 
resilience 
forum and 
partnership 
M23 Cat.1 No 1-3  Government and “Local resilience forums”. 
A09 Cat.2 No 1-3 “Local devolved institutions”. 
A 12 NGO No 3-5  “Resilience partnership”. 
Table 6- Comments reported in the section “other” of Question 13, “who do you think should assure the 
consistency of information”. 
 
Finally, Table 7 reports other comments included in the questionnaire that can support the 
interpretation of the answers. There was a limited numberof adds-ons, and three categories 
were identified:  
 
 Climate Change: the comments, made by Cat. 1 responders, mostly referred to the 
problems of understanding medium term impacts that can be seen in contrast with 
immediate priorities, in particular in situations of budget cuts.  
 Guidance on training: two comments highlighted preferences in training. A member of 
business pointed out the usefulness of tabletop exercises, while the cross tabs suggest 
some slightly more negative perceptions of this training for this category. Instead, a Cat. 
1 responder confirmed the usefulness of guidelines and the contrast with webinars in line 
with the frequency distribution.  
 
In conclusion, it is needed to add the category “other” for two specifications that could be of 
use: In correspondence of a high value attributed to DSS as mitigation tool it was reported 
that its limit was “unless GPS collapse”, while a member of academia highlighted the 
availability of statistical methods as forecasting tools.  
 
 
 
 
Q13 
“Other”  
ID  Affiliation Trai
ning 
Exp. 
(years) 
Other comments 
Climate 
Change 
M08 Cat.1  No 3-5 
Referring to Q15 on integration of climate change in planning 
“Trying to - does not happen as much as it should. There is still a 
view that impacts are too far ahead and local authorities look to 
4-5 years planning dates”. 
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A16 Cat.1 Yes 10+ 
Referring to Q15 on integration of climate change in planning 
specifies “limited budgets create limited opportunities for such 
long-term planning”. 
M14 
Cat.1/acade
mic (other) 
Yes 3-5 
‘’Need a definition on cascading events and secondary impacts 
emergency response plan and preparedness to all events -
climate induced or man-made. Cat 1 and2 responders are well 
trained and experienced in response and communication. No 
focus on climate change as priority is immediate life -saving”. 
Guidance 
on 
training 
M19 Business Yes 5-10 
 Specifies that roundtables and table top exercises (Q19b) are 
the “most useful” training. 
A 31 Cat.1 Yes 10+ 
Specifies that guidelines (Q19c) are “very useful especially for 
planners”, While webinars (Q19d) “not useful at all” because of 
“no time”. 
Other  
M15 Academic Yes 3-5 
It specifies that “thresholds are important and using subjective 
terms could cause more confusion”, referring to Q5. Moreover, it 
specifies the role of “Bayesian and Markovian networks mapping 
the interdependencies” as methodological options together with 
impact trees and forward-looking tools. 
M16 Academic No 3-5 
The value of Decision support systems I high “Unless GPS 
collapse!”. 
 
Table 6 – Answers to “other” comments, that correspond to Q26 as reported in Table 1.   
 
6. Discussion 
Our evidence confirms the hypothesis that the current crisis management approach to 
cascading risk is inadequate.  London’s stakeholders are concerned and aware of the 
relevance of cascading events and interdependencies, that are perceived as threats to life 
without being sufficiently incorporated in the current policies, practices, and emergency 
management at large.  There is more awareness about the need to create a paradigm shift 
toimprove the resilience to cascades and complex events, but this is far for being fully 
implemented (Helbing 2013; Linkov et al. 2014). However, while many gaps confirmed thefirst 
hypothesis, the results suggested also a slight improvement of the situation if compared to 
the evidence provided by Luiijf and Klaver (2013).  It is clear that the definitions of operational 
tipping points and uncertainties are critical challenges that need immediate actions, although 
they are recurring issues highlighted in the literature on the 2010 ash cloud, environmental 
change, and cascading effects (Alexander 2013; Amon et al. 2016; Scaini et al. 2015; 
Wardekker et al. 2008). On the one hand, the definition of tipping points and uncertainties 
could increase the flexibility of response, in line with the need for specifying priorities and 
inter-organisational coordination highlighted as critical elements for emergency planning by 
Perry and Lindell (2003). On the other hand,  contingency planning and scenario building were 
considered the solid bases for  providing a better understanding of cascades, and could be 
used to increase the flexibility to uncertainties and the escalation of secondary crises as 
argued by different authors (Alexander 2016; Münzberg et al. 2017; Pescaroli and Alexander 
2016). Finally, the respondents believed that cascading events could become more common 
as a result of climate change as is recognised in the literature due to the increased pressure 
on the built environment, leadership and on society (Galaz et al. 2011; Linkov et al. 2014). 
Most mitigation measures received high values in the responses, confirming the hypothesis 
that  improvements on the status quo are urgently needed.   Itis commonly perceived that 
hazard risk maps and critical infrastructure rankings should be integrated in the broader 
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legislation (Nones and Pescaroli 2016), as well as improvements in intermodal coordination 
(Alexander 2013).  The value attributed to decision support tools ishigh, and could be 
associated with the need to assure communication and exchange of information that could 
be vital in complex emergencies  (Scaini et al. 2015; Setola et al. 2016; Ulfarsson and Unger 
2011). This seems to be confirmed by some of the qualitative answers about mitigation 
measures. The knowledge of interdependencies was a critical point also in the qualitative 
comments, but mostly within the academic community and Cat. 2 responders more than Cat. 
1 responders which may suggest reflecting better on the target groups for which each 
strategy is settled. Moreover, the responders attribute some priority to the need for 
improving information for optimising procurement strategies and deployment, as well as for 
the integration of the local energy supply for increasing CI resilience. This was quite surprising, 
because we expected much higher values and shared agreement on those two items. The 
result is not low enough to contradict the literature (Helbing 2015; Pescaroli and Kelman 
2017; Petermann et al. 2011), but further investigations should be made to understand if 
those measures are more context dependent than what believed. Some separate 
considerations must be made about the perceived need for international mitigation 
strategies, where the values were very low and completely different from what could have 
been expected. There is an unequivocal misunderstanding of the cross-border dimension of 
cascades,  aspects of which have been described widely in the literature (Boin and McConnell 
2007; Ansell et al. 2010; Galaz et al. 2011). This may be associated with different operational 
roles that do not necessarily provide a vision of the bigger picture, but also influenced by 
training levels as verified with the analysis of correlations.  
The qualitative answers proposed a complementary point of view about mitigation measures. 
The respondents consistently pointed out that knowledge of risk, interdependencies and 
vulnerabilities must be associated with a better work on community resilience, coordination 
and information sharing. Again, therewas highlighted the need for more shared responsibility 
of emergency management and more dialogue between the local and the national level. 
These are well known issues for the emergency management community that developed 
criteria and framework  such as the work of Quarantelli (1997), Alexander (2002;2005), Boin 
and McConnell (2007), and Abrahamsson et. al. (2010). These should be applied also in 
mitigating cascading risk, using the need for renewal to improve and evolve the existing 
system. The low level of participation of NGOs and charities suggests that further steps are 
needed in that direction both in policy, practice and future researches.  Some other points 
highlighted open issues in linking climate change adaptation in emergency planning, both in 
terms of uncertainties about longer term impacts, and possible coordination issues as 
commonly agreed in the literature (Wardekker et al. 2008, Linkov et al. 2014). 
The low average values attributed to training levels contrasted with the high value reported 
for all the tools of improvement, and in line with our expectations the responses defined the 
need for further work. It seems that the priority should be attributed to increase the dialogue 
and availability of information for improving inter-agency coordination, which is one of the 
critical points suggested by Perry and Lindell (2003). Open access guidelines could be 
considered a feasible tool to support this process.  Moreover, the good values attributed to 
training and exercises may be in line with the positive effects registered by Parker (2015), 
after the 2010 eruption, and more in general with the basic strategies adopted for improving 
emergency management (Lindell et al. 2007).  Even in this case, the open answers supported 
the idea the need for improving the involvement of the public and the coordination process 
(Quarantelli 1997; Alexander 2002;2005, and Abrahamsson et. al. 2010). They also stated very 
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clearly the role of scenario and exercises for understanding better cascades as suggested 
recently (Pescaroli and Alexander 2016, Alexander 2016, Pescaroli et al. 2018).  However, it 
must be noted that the knowledge of wider impact analysis, impact trees and other forward-
looking tools suggested by Mc Farlane (2015) was much better than expected. This may 
confirm again that a process of change may be in progress at least in our case study, shifting 
slightly from what was suggested by Luiijf and Klaver (2013). 
In conclusion, the analysis of correlations does not add consistent evidence for the discussion. 
The limited strengths that we registered in the tables may be oriented by the size of the 
dataset, that further analysis should be done in that direction. However, there can be noted 
a constant influence of the training received by the respondents with the perceptions of cross 
-border management. In other words, the cross-border element of cascading risk is something 
more associated with training levels as it does not necessarily enter in the operational 
routines of stakeholders.  This is in line with the evidence that training is a vital support for 
understanding the bigger picture of emergencies and disaster (Alexander 2002;2005;Lindell 
et al. 2007), and it could be useful to produce a better understanding of the cross-border 
component of  cascading crisis among the respondents. In conclusion, the stronger 
correlation recorded was between the values attributed to possible training tools such as free 
guidelines and webinars, which were the most and the least popular options. This may be 
associated with the fact that the two things are often complementary, for example in the 
training provided by the United Nations, but in a situation of limited resources these data may 
suggest concentrating the budget on the better perceived option as the target may be the 
similar. Further research should investigate this aspect, while in the next section we draw 
some general conclusions from this study and recommendations from this study. 
7. Conclusions 
This research investigated the perceptions of cascading events and interdependencies among 
London’s stakeholders, and provided evidence to support actions for improving policies and 
operational resilience.  Our analysis highlighted that cascades were perceived as a very 
relevant threat for society and emergency management, but further work is needed for 
adapting mitigations and training strategies. The diffused perception that the loss of services 
can cause risk to life has strong implications for multi-agency coordination: disruptions can 
be seen as directly challenging the core mission of emergency services, like other 
conventional threats such as floods. De facto, our data show that cascades cannot be 
considered anymore as marginal topics and need to be better catered for in emergency 
planning, including considerations on their relationship with climate change.   It is strongly 
needed to evolve policies and practices, developing an agenda that should include some key 
strategic actions: 
 Improving intermodal coordination at the local, national and cross-national levels, which 
has been a lesson not applied from the 2010 ash cloud; 
 Integrating hazard risk maps and critical infrastructure maps, using existing frameworks 
such as the European floods directive;  
 Promoting definitions of tipping points and acceptable risk for supporting multi-agency 
coordination, linking climate change adaptation and preparedness arrangements, and 
clarifying the attribution of responsibilities in the scenario of high uncertainties; 
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 Including community resilience, training of the citizens, and the involvement of  pro-active 
resilience actors in the planning and management of cascading risk; 
 Investing in table-top exercises and guidelines for end users, developing scenario building 
and contingency planning, and supporting the awareness of interdependencies with the 
use of Decision Support Systems; 
 Using training to strengthen the cross-border component of cascading risk, including 
adaptation to climate change drivers as part of emergency preparedness; 
 Improve the discussion on the possible use of localized energy sources and on which 
datasets on the resources needed to contain extended services disruptions. 
 
Our data set has limitations, but they do not invalidate the results, while suggesting new steps 
for future researches. We are aware that expert judgment must be used with care, as it can 
introduce subjectivities and cultural biases into the assessment (Skjong and Wentworth 
2001). We mitigated this issue piloting the questionnaire, using together descriptive and 
numeric Likert scales, explaining the concepts at the beginning of the workshop, and adapting 
a mixed method approach.  However, the limitations of assessing risk perceptions remains. It 
must be considered that the results could have been influenced by the synergies with 
ANYTOWN in different ways.   
First, it cannot be excluded that organizations with higher awareness of cascading and 
interdependencies could have been keener to support the participation of their personnel.  
This factor seems to have a limited impact on our dataset because the distribution of 
frequencies on previous training and participation to other workshops suggest that the 
respondents were mixed.  Further research should consider a focus on how organisational 
culture could influence the preparedness to cascades in order to highlight possible gaps and 
inconsistencies that need guidance from coordination agencies.   
Secondly, the initial focus on transportation could have attracted some sort of “sectorial” 
expertise, influencing the answers on mitigation measures.  Even in this case, in our data this 
component seems to be mediated by the cross-cutting interest registered in the workshop 
and by the strong involvement of Category 1 responders.  We would recommend that further 
steps should be made to explore the differences between organisations and categories of 
responders, including a better perspective of small- medium enterprises, charities and NGOs 
whose participation to the workshop was limited.   
Thirdly, using London as a case study presented the advantage of accessing a mixed target 
group that otherwise could have been very hard to involve in this type of research.  The 
collaboration with LR and LCCP allowed the unique opportunity to develop an integrative 
research process, accessing stakeholders that otherwise may have not been so collaborative.  
The unique level of global interdependencies concentrated in London was an essential part 
of this process, as it determined the existing projects of the authority. However, it may be 
considered also a limitation. How much does London’s ranking in the global cities influence 
the risk perception of stakeholders? Are data elsewhere still more in line with the evidence 
provided by Luiijf and Klaver (2013)? It could be desirable to replicate this study in different 
environments to understand the variations in risk perceptions, testing possible differences 
between rural and urban areas to promote new coordinated measures for operational 
resilience.    
In conclusion, it must be noted that this research does not pretend to be exhaustive, but it 
consolidates the basis for further cross-disciplinary analyses. For example, this paper did not 
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investigate the psychometric dimensions of cascading risk because it was decided with these 
stakeholders to focus on other and more “basic” aspects.  It could be argued that a better 
analysis of the psychological drivers could be another element to investigate in the future, 
exploring other correlations and defining specific target groups for training and policies.  
Future research may benefit also from a wider use of qualitative   methodology, such as semi-
structured interviews and focus groups, that in this case were not feasible because of time 
and resource constraints. A final and critical point that should be addressed involves the 
citizens’ perception of cascades to understand how to increase the preparedness of society 
and to produce timely responses in case of disruptions. Are citizens’ priorities changing and 
influencing what they expect from emergency services? It could be argued that   cascading 
events and interdependencies cannot be intended anymore as one of the many aspects of 
emergency planning and management, but must be seen as a constant background that will 
orientate future disaster risk reduction from citizens to planners. There is a long way forward 
to achieve effective policies, mitigation, and training for a complex and fast evolving context.  
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